After reading Kent's post about the letter he sent to the DPS office, I went looking for some information to cross check his. This is the information I found. I would like to point out that I went through the SSA site thoroughly and didn't find a mention of the Privacy Act Notice. If anyone knows where this is available, let me know.

Well, I found a copy of the Privacy Act Notice at my house. I read through it and found that: The Privacy Act of 1974 (U.S. Public Law 93-579, Sect. 7) requires that you be notified that disclosure of your social security number is voluntary. It also corresponds with the information I posted from the SSA. I believe that was the piece of paper that Kent was handed at the DPS office. You don't have to read the notice itself for the agency to be in compliance, but anyone asking for a social security number has to notify you that it is voluntary. I found the notice on the DPS website. Failure to disclose this information allows them to deny you whatever you're trying to get, which includes a drivers license. Now, before anyone else decides to go into a DPS office and demand to see a Privacy Act Notice and accuse the people there of breaking the law, you may want to think twice. The DPS office is upholding the law, not breaking it. If you'd like this changed, get on the phone with the legislators and get the Family Code, Section 231.302 changed. Brian +

The SSN will not appear on the driver license itself and will be made available only to DPS for identification purposes and to the Child Support Division of the State Attorney General’s Office for child support enforcement. This appears to be in cotnradiction with the family code. Used for identification purposes is not what the section of law below says is a legal use. Senator Wentworth's and Representative Corte's offices have both informed me that almost all Texas Agencies have access to this personal information including SSN now and DPS is also selling it.  Air Force Security (CERT) Personnel have confirmed that SSN's are included in the information sold by DPS. In '94 the Ohio Supreme court, regarding the disclosure of SSN's of city employees, stated:  The city and amicicontend that disclosure of the SSNs would violate  the right to privacy of city employees and, thus, is not permissible.  R.C. 149.43(A) expressly excludes the release of records which would  violate state or federal law. Because we find that the disclosure of the  SSNs would violate the federal constitutional right to privacy, we find  them to be excluded from mandatory disclosure. <2   The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in  fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the  individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and  another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of  important decisions. (Footnotes omitted.) Whalen v. Roe (1977), 429 U.S.  589, 598-600, 97 S. Ct. 869, 876, 51 L. Ed. 2d 64, 73.  The first  interest is relevant to the matter before us.  The right to avoid disclosure of personal matters is so broad in scope  that it applies to the most public of our public figures. Even the  President of the United States possesses this right. Nixon v. Admr. of  Gen. Serv. (1977), 433 U.S. 425, 457, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2797, 53 L. Ed. 2d  867, 900.  The Nixon court found that appellant [Nixon] has a legitimate  expectation of privacy in his personal communications. Id., 433 U.S. at  465, 97 S.Ct. at 2801, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 905. The court concluded, however,  that this right to privacy was not absolute. Instead, the court found  that when an individual has an interest in avoiding disclosure, that  interest must be weighed with the government's interest in disclosing the  information. The constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the  context of the limited intrusion of the screening process, of appellant's  status as a public figure, of his lack of any expectation of privacy in  the overwhelming majority of the materials, of the important public  interest in preservation of the materials, and of the virtual  impossibility of segregating the small quantity of private materials  without comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act's  sensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy interests * * *, the  unblemished record of the archivists for discretion, and the likelihood  that the regulations to be promulgated by the Administrator will further  moot appellant's fears that his  materials will be reviewed by 'a host of  persons,' * * * we are compelled to agree with the District Court that  appellant's privacy claim is without merit. Id.  Thus, according to the Nixon case, there is a federal right to privacy  which protects against governmental disclosure of the private details of  one's life. Nixon, although not dispositive of the case before us, sets  forth the parameters of the right to privacy that we apply to the present  case. We must use an analysis similar to that used in Nixon to determine  whether the right to privacy of city employees is invaded when the city  reveals their SSNs to all inquirers. We must determine whether the city  employees have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their SSNs and then  whether their privacy interests outweigh those interests benefited by  disclosure of the numbers. Slayton v. Willingham (C.A.10, 1984), 726 F.2d  631, 635.  Expectation of Privacy  Due to the federal legislative scheme involving the use of SSNs, city  employees have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their SSNs.  Uncodified Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 provides the following:     (a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual's refusal to disclose his social security account number. * * *     (b) Any Federal, State, or local government agency which requests an    individual to disclose his social security account number shall inform    that individual whether that disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by    what statutory or other authority such number is solicited, and what uses    will be made of it. Section 552a note (Disclosure of Social Security    Number), _title_ 5, U.S.Code, Pub.L. No. 93-579, Section 7, 88 Stat. 1896,    1909.   The purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974 was to curtail the expanding  use of social security numbers by federal and local agencies and, by so  doing, to eliminate the threat to individual privacy and confidentiality  of information posed by common numerical identifiers. Doyle v. Wilson  (D.Del.1982), 529 F. Supp. 1343, 1348.    Congress when enacting the Privacy Act of 1974 was codifying the  societal perception that SSNs should not to be available to all. This  legislative scheme is sufficient to create an expectation of privacy in  the minds of city employees concerning the use and disclosure of their  SSNs.  Weighing Interests Benefited by Disclosure Against Privacy Interests    Having held that employees of the city have a reasonable expectation  of privacy regarding the disclosure of their Social Security numbers, we  must weigh these privacy interests against those favoring disclosure.    The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a  case similar to this one in Greidinger v. Davis (C.A.4, 1993), 988 F.2d  1344. In Greidinger, the plaintiff challenged Virginia voting laws that  required citizens to provide their SSNs when registering to vote. These  SSNs were available to anyone who purchased voter registration lists. The  state of Virginia claimed that the SSNs were necessary to avoid voter  fraud. The court of appeals held that Virginia's interest in internal use  of SSNs did not justify disclosure and that other data such as voter  registration numbers or addresses would provide the state with enough  information to distinguish voters with the same name.    The appellate court held that the disclosure of this other information  was less intrusive than the disclosure of SSNs. The Greidinger court  listed the potential jeopardy that voters would be placed in if their  Social Security numbers were recorded and then unconditionally released:     Armed with one's SSN, an unscrupulous individual could obtain a  person's welfare benefits or Social Security benefits, order new checks  at a new address on that person's checking account, obtain credit cards,  or even obtain the person's paycheck. * * * Succinctly stated, the harm  that can be inflicted from the disclosure of an SSN to an unscrupulous  individual is alarming and potentially financially ruinous. Id. at  1353-1354.    After discussing the potential evils created by the release of voters'  SSNs, the Greidinger court stated:     Virginia's voter registration form requires a registrant things, his  name, address, SSN, age, place of birth, and county of previous  registration. Virginia's interest in preventing voter fraud and voter  participation could easily be met without the disclosure of the SSN and  the attendant possibility of a serious invasion of privacy that would  result from that disclosure. * * * Most assuredly, an address or date of  birth would sufficiently distinguish among voters that shared a common  name. Id. at 1354-1355.    The case before this court requires analysis similar to that used by  the Greidinger court. The public's interest in obtaining city employees'  SSNs must be weighed against the harm caused by the invasion of  employees' privacy resulting from the release of the SSNs.    It is fundamental tenet of democracy that the people, the press, and  the media be fully informed about the processes of their government. As  John Adams noted, liberty cannot be preserved without a general  knowledge among the people, who have a right * * * and a desire to know;  but besides this, they have a right, an indisputable, unalienable,  indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of  knowledge, I mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers. John  Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765). However, this  right is by no means boundless or unconditional. See Nixon.    The city's refusal to release its employees' SSNs does not  significantly interfere with the public's right to monitor governmental  conduct. The numbers by themselves reveal little information about the  city's employees.  The city provided appellees with enormous amounts of  other information about each city employee; only the SSNs numbers were  deleted. Employees' addresses, telephone numbers, salaries, level of  education, and birth dates, among other things,  were all provided. The  data supplied by the city provides far more enlightening information  about the composition of the city's workforce than would SSNs.    While the release of all city employees' SSNs would provide inquirers  with little useful information about the organization of their  government, the release of the numbers could allow an inquirer to  discover the intimate, personal details of each city employee's life,  which are completely irrelevant to the operations of government. As the  Greidinger court warned, a person's SSN is a device which can quickly be  used
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1) DPS personnel appears to be required to obtain SSN. My disagreement  with DPS is that they are not providing the requirements stated by  by the Privacy Act of 74, and threatening to arrest one because they  request such information is a violation of the Privacy Act and the  Freedom of Information Act. Kent, I requested information from the DPS. They responded with a lengthy email explaining the reasons behind their asking for SSN's, what they do with the information, and what laws authorize them to check SSN's. They provided *more* information than the Privacy Act requires. I also checked the DPS website and received the information required by the Privacy Act. Not once was I 'threatened' with arrest for requesting this information. Perhaps it was the way you asked for the information? Or perhaps we still don't know the entire story behind you being threatened with arrest? Brian +